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INADEQUATE TRAINING IN THE USE OF NON-DEADLY FORCE
AS THE NEXT FRONTIER IN FEDERAL CIVIL LIABILITY:
ANALYSIS OF THE BALTIMORE CITY BATON PROGRAM

Brian L. DeLeonardo

Police officers possess awesome powers. They perform their duties under
hazardous conditions and with the vigilant public eye upon them. Police
officers are permitted only a margin of error in judgment under conditions
that impose high degrees ofphysical and mental stress. Their general responsibility to preserve peace and enforce the law carries with it the power to
arrest and to use force - even deadly force. }

I. INTRODUCTION

ly using deadly force, but by no means has that possibility been eliminated. Second, police departments have
focused heavily on finding techniques and weapons that
Police officers face one ofthe most "hostile" work
environments of any profession. 2 Not only is the crime effectively and safely allow officers to carry out their
rate significant, with over 14.1 million crimes reported duties, while minimizing risk of injury to the suspect. IO
in 1993 alone, 3 but police officers are increasingly likely These "non-deadly" weapons include batons, police
to be involved in physical confrontations with suspects. 4 dogs, tasers (stun guns), pepper spray, and hand-toBetween 1980 and 1989 alone, 1,514 police officers hand defense techniques. The demand by police departwere killed or died in the line of duty.5 Additionally, ments for new and improved non-deadly weapons has
police officers have seen their ability to use deadly force been so intense that manufacturers work furiously to be
in apprehending suspects curtailed over the last decade the first on the market with some new "gadget" to add
through a series of United States Supreme Court deci- to the police arsenal. II
Nevertheless, the rapid adoption of non-deadly
sions. 6 This has served to add pressure to officers when
weapons
and techniques by police departments has
making the split-second decision of whether to use
deadly force. Moreover, when police officers use been a mixed blessing. While such weapons and
deadly force in apprehending a suspect, that decision techniques have substantially reduced the likelihood of
will frequently spark a public outcry, an internal inves- death in police officer/suspect confrontations,12 they
tigation, and in some situations, a criminal prosecution have also served to foster a new area of excessive force
ofthe police officer. 7 In addition, a police officer's split- civil judgments based upon the excessive use of nonsecond miscalculation to use deadly force may result in deadly weapons and techniques. 13 A primary reason for
the civil liability in less than lethal force situations is that
a civil suit and large monetary judgment. 8
Police departments have responded to this difficult the vast majority of pol ice departments have little to no
work environment in two ways. First, police depart- formal rules on the.use of non-deadly force. Strangely,
ments have vigorously worked to ensure that their unlike the strides made by police departments in the
police officers are proficient in the use of firearms and deadly force arena, no detailed requirements for inknowledgeable in the legal limits for using these weap- service training and annual certification in the use of
ons. This is accomplished by providing not only the non-deadly weapons and techniques are in place. 14 This
initial training in the academy, but also mandating in- lack of training and fear of liability has led many
service training and annual certification while the offic- departments to end the use of some non-deadly weapers are on the force. 9 This increased training has ons altogether. 15 Moreover, the devastating effects of
reduced the likelihood of a police officer inappropriate- these weapons is systematically underplayed, which in
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many situations has led to many unintended deaths of
non-violent suspects.
An overview of the new Baltimore City Police
Department baton training program provides a good
basis for analyzing the deficiencies and problems associated with the adoption and use ofnon-deadly weapons
and techniques. By recognizing the deficiencies in the
non-deadly weapons training being provided to its
police officers, the Baltimore City Police Department
can avoid the civil liability that is sure to follow as courts
slowly become as demanding on a police officers' use
of non-deadly weapons as courts have become on the
use of deadly weapons. 16

II. MUNICIPALITIES ARE SUBJECT TO FEDERAL CIVIL LIABILITY FOR THE USE OF
EXCESSIVE FORCE BY THEIR POLICE
OFFICERS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF
INADEQUATE TRAINING
Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code
provides a civil tort remedy for citizens who have their
federal constitutional rights violated by government
officialsY This federal statutory remedy, which was
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was passed
in order to provide a mechanism for eliminatingKu Klux
Klan activity in the South by providing a neutral federal
forum for newly freed slaves to bring claims against
government officials who violated their civil rights. 18
Today, section 1983 provides a vehicle for citizens to
seek redress of constitutional deprivations by police
officers who have used excessive force in violation of
the citizen's constitutionally protected rights. In order
to maintain a section 1983 action, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he has suffered a constitutional deprivation, the deprivation was the result of an action taken
under color of state law, and that the constitutional
deprivation resulted in injury to the plaintiff. 19
A. THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN APPRE-

HENDING SUSPECTS BY POLICE OFFICERS
CONSTITUTES A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONENTITLED TO REDRESS UNDER 42 U.S.C.
SECTION 1983

misdemeanant. in 1985, however, the United States
Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner20 changed the
way in which the use of deadly force by police officers
against suspects was to be analyzed by holding that the
apprehension ofa criminal suspect "by the use ofdeadly
force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment."21
In determining whether a seizure is reasonable, the
Garner opinion noted that "[w]e must balance the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. "22 The Court noted that "[t ]he intrusiveness of a
seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched,"23 and
therefore, such force is only appropriate when "it is
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical harm,
either to the officer or others. "24 Thus, the Court found
that the reasonableness of the use of deadly force to
seize a person must be determined through a balancing
test, considering the totality of the circumstances.
The Court later extended this analysis to the use of
non-deadly force by a police officer in apprehending a
suspect. In Graham v. Connor,25 the Court was confronted with a claim that the police had used excessive
non-deadly force with a diabetic man during an investigatory stop. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard is the proper standard
for analyzing all claims that police officers have used
excessive force in making arrests, investigatory stops,
or other seizures of citizens. 26 The Court added that in
determining the reasonableness of the force used, the
analysis must be from the perspective of a reasonable
officer at the scene "rather than with the 20120 vision
ofhindsight."27 Furthermore, the Court instructed that
this test is an objective one, i.e., whether the officers'
actions were objectively reasonable in light of the
circumstances confronting them, without considering
intent or motivation. 28 The Court noted, in assessing the
reasonableness of the degree of force used by police
officers, one should consider the severity of the crime
the suspect allegedly committed, whether the suspect
posed an immediate danger to the police or others, and
whether the suspect was resisting or fleeing. 29

At common law, police officers had a privilege to
use deadly force when attempting to arrest a fleeing B. A MUNICIPALITY MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE
felon, but not when attempting to arrest a fleeing USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE BY ITS POLICE
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OFFICERS IF THE MUNICIPALITY HAS PROVIDED INADEQUATE TRAINING TO THOSE
POLICE OFFICERS
The decisions of Garner and Graham established
that if excessive force is used by police officers in
apprehending a suspect, whether such force is deadly or
not, a Fourth Amendment constitutional violation has
occurred. Police officers who use excessive force on
the suspect are liable under section 1983 for damages
arising from the constitutional violation. 30 Additionally,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the
municipality that employs police officers may also be
liable for the constitutional violation arising from the
use of excessive force. 31
In Monell v. Dept. of Social Services,32 the Court
recognized that, although the doctrine of respondeat
superior was not available as a method for imposing
governmental liability under section 1983, local governments could be sued when "the action that is alleged
to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted and promulgated by that body's officer. "33
The Court, however, did not limit the scope of municipal liability to only its formally promulgated policies.
Rather, the Court held that the municipality "may be
sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to
governmental' custom' even though such a custom has
not received formal approval through the body's decision-making channels."34 The Court, however, was
clear in its requirement that for the municipality to be
found liable for the unconstitutional actions of its
employees, there must be a direct causal link: between a
municipal policy or custom and the unconstitutional
harm that was actually suffered.
Several years later, the Court further expanded the
liability of municipalities by liberally interpreting what
constitutes a "policy" or "custom." The Court, in
Canton v. Harris,35 held that the inadequacy of police
training may be a basis for section 1983 liability where
the failure to adequately train amounts to a deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
police officers come into contact. 36 The Court reasoned
that "[t]he issue ina case like this one ... is whether that
training program is adequate; and if it is not, the
question becomes whether such inadequate training can
justifiably be said to represent 'city policy. '" 37 The
Court, in addressing the paradox that a lack of action

equals policy, explained that:
[I]t may happen that in light ofthe duties
assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policy makers of
the city can reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need.
In that event, the failure to provide
proper training may fairly be said to
represent a policy for which the city is
responsible, and for which the city may
be held liable if it actually causes injury.38
Against this legal backdrop, an analysis of the
Baltimore City Police Department's baton program,
and the liability and risks associated with the program,
can be evaluated. The Baltimore City Police Department can be held liable for the Department's actual
excessive force training policies, and for inadequate
non-deadly force policies and training programs where
such a deficiency in training demonstrates that the
Department was deliberately indifferent to the obvious
constitutional violations likely to result.
ill. THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPART-

MENT'S BATON PROGRAM - INDICATIVE OF
THE PROBLEMS AND SECTION 1983 LIABILITY RISKS INCURRED WITH THE ADOPTION
OF NON-DEADLY WEAPONRY
The Baltimore City Police Department recently
requested an examination of its policies and techniques
from a consultant who has provided similar services to
many police departments across the country.39 Robert
K. Koga, the founder of the Koga Institute, Inc.
("KOGA"), determined that the Department needed to
better train its officers in the use of force against
suspects. KOGA recommended that the Baltimore City
Police Department replace the 22-inch knurled-ended
nightstick, presently used by officers, with a 29-inch
straight baton and that officers undergo KOGA' s training program on using the baton. 40 This new training
program provided by KOGA has been the subject of
sharp criticism. Primarily, officers who have gone
26.2/ U. Bait. L.F. - 25

through the training have noted that the instructors
emphasize a "two-handed strike aimed at the chest or
joints," whereas "previous training had officers aiming
for large muscle mass or the legs. "41 One officer even
commented that "[t]his is the most dangerous thing I've
seen."42
There appears to be more than a sufficient basis for
questioning the propriety of this program in light of the
potential for liability that the program creates for the
City ofBaltimore. The baton program inBaltimore City
reflects the general problem with the treatment of nondeadly weapons and techniques by police departments
across the country. Inadequate training of police
officers can be found not only because ofthe Baltimore
Police Department' s actual policies and programs, which
underplay the actual force utilized in their baton techniques, but also for the Department's deliberate indifference to the need for better training of the police
officers in deciding when the use of non-deadly weapons is appropriate. Both deficiencies have made the
Baltimore City Police Department, as well as many
other police departments, ripe for section 1983 liability.
A. BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
BATON TRAINING PROGRAM IS PACKAGED
AS A NON-DEADLY TECHNIQUE
The baton techniques that are taught to Baltimore
City Police Department officers are contained in an
instructional manual produced by KOGA. 43 In the
manual, KOGA separates the force police officers use
into three categories: (1) controlling force, (2) injuring
force, and (3) deadly force. 44 KOGA defines controlling
force as "physical control ranging all the way from
exerting a firm grip on an individual through pain
compliance control holds to an actual physical control
hold or lock. "45 Injuring force is defined as including
the use of a "baton or other impact weapon, as well as
some self-defense tactics."46 Deadly force, on the other
hand, is defined to include "the use ofa weapon or tactic
that carries with it a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury. "47
As this breakdown of force indicates, KOGA believes and teaches that the use of the baton is best
classified as injuring force, and thus, that the KOGA
baton techniques are capable of being performed in
situations calling for less than deadly force. As KOGA
explains:
26 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2

Police officers have often become confused about when the baton may be used
in a situation. In most situations, a
police officer's best defense is weaponless control. Other rarer situations call
for the employment ofthe firearm. Somewhere in between, however, there may
be circumstances which require more
force than can reasonably be applied
without a weapon, but that fall short of
calling for a firearm. These are situations which call for the use of a baton. 48
Specifically, KOGA teaches that police officers can
consider using the baton when:
1.
They are confronted by an uncontrolled, violently resisting subject,
or are being attacked in a manner not
calling for the use of deadly force, and
they have attempted to or rejected the
use of lesser force;

2.
The suspect has a similar weapon, such as a baton, or perhaps a knife;
3.
The suspect is larger than them,
and has demonstrated to have superior
skill and ability;
4.
Tactical considerations such as
a riot demand immediate control. 49

While the above situations may in some instances
actually call for the use ofdeadly force, KOGA indicates
that baton strikes can be used even in non-deadly force
situations. KOGA further conveys its belief in the nondeadly nature of certain baton techniques through illustrations in the manual demonstrating use of these baton
techniques on an unarmed criminal suspect.
In regard to the actual baton techniques utilized,
KOGA establishes a list of preferred areas ofthe body
that a police officer may strike. The police officers are
instructed that:
When striking an aggressor with a baton, the best target areas are those areas
where the underlying bone is closest to

the surface of the skin. Suitable areas
are those which are easily accessible and
effective for quickly subduing the aggressor, yet unlikely to cause serious
injury. In general, these areas are the
lower legs, arms, chest, midsection, and
the rib cage. 50

While not all of the baton techniques taught to
Baltimore City police officers constitute deadly force,
it is difficult to conceive how the two-handed thrust to
the chest can be anything but deadly force. The force
that is exerted from such use of the baton is enormous.
As a KOGA trained instructor stated, the new baton
being used "packs a bigger wallop" and "is better
suited for samurai-sword-like swings, which help the
The method of striking these areas takes two forms: officer strike suspects fewer times in areas deemed
thrusting blows and striking blows. Thrusting is defined 'acceptable targets."'55 One newspaper reporter, on
by KOGA as a "one or two-handed jabbing motion, assessing the KOGA method, noted that "when swung
employing one rounded end ofthe baton for the strike," properly, [the baton] can lay a person low without
while striking is defined as a "one or two-hand [ed] drawing blood. It can also shatter a door, break an ax
strike with the baton, as if cutting with a sword. "51 In handle in half or shatter bones."56 In light of the power
regard to the injury that could result from such a blow, that police officers can exert with the butt end of the
KOGA states that "the aggressor against whom the baton, especially when using both hands to maximize
police baton is used will most probably suffer injury, the force, it is obvious that the thrusting baton blows to
albeit usually minor."52
the chest and ribs create a substantial risk of causing
death or serious bodily harm.
Indeed, "[s]erious chest injuries are often fatal due
B. THEBATONST~STOTHECHESTTHAT
KOGA TEACHES BALTIMORE CITY POLICE to the possibility of injury to the lungs, heart and great
OFFICERS AS NON-DEADLY FORCE ACTUAL- vessels~ and the many types of complications that arise
from penetrating or blunt traumas to these organs. "57
L Y CONSTITUTES DEADLY FORCE
The chest, which is enclosed by the ribs, contains the
While the United States Supreme Court in Tennes- heart, lungs, veins and arteries that enter the heart,
see v. Garner held that the use of deadly force was a trachea, bronchi (the airways to the lungs) and the
seizure, and thus subject to the Fourth Amendment's esophagus. 58 The fracturing or breaking of the ribs
reasonableness requirement, the Court did not define could result in the puncturing of a lung, which can be
what type offorce constitutes deadly force. The Model fatal. 59 Injury to the arteries of the heart can result in
Penal Code, drafted by the American Law Institute, massive internal bleeding.60 Moreover, a strong blunt
provides a useful definition that has been adopted by force directed at the chest can also "fracture four or
many courts. 53 It defines deadly force as:
more ribs on the same side and produce a condition
known as flail chest," a condition where the fractured
ribs move separately from the rest ofthe chest area when
Force which the actor uses with the
breathing, thereby resulting in breathing difficulty.61
purpose of causing or which he knows
to create a substantial risk of causing
Hospitalized individuals with "injuries only ofthe chest
death or serious bodily harm. Purposely
have a four to eight percent mortality rate. The rate rises
firing a firearm in the direction of anothto ten to fifteen percent when one additional organ
er person or at a vehicle in which anothsystem is involved, and to thirty-five percent when there
er person is believed to be constitutes
are multiple-organ-system injuries. "62 In light of all the
deadly force. A threat to cause death or
medical complications that can arise from the use of a
serious bodily harm, by the production
thrusting chest blow, the technique is best considered
of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the
deadly force. Contrary to the assessment made by the
actor's purpose is limited to creating an
Baltimore City Police Department, the conclusion that
apprehension that he will use deadly
a baton strike to the chest is deadly force has been
reached by the majority of police departments around
force if necessary, does not constitute
deadly force. 54
the country. 63
26.2/ U. 8alt. L.F. - 27

C. THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTBATONPROGRAM,BYMISCLASSIFYING
BATON USE AS NON-DEADLY FORCE AND
F AILING TO PROVIDE PROPER TRAINING IN
THE USE OF NON-DEADLY WEAPONS, RUNS
THE RISK OF CIVIL LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE TRAINING
There are two main grounds for finding section
1983 liability against Baltimore City for failing to
adequately train its police officers. First, the
misclassification of a baton strike to the chest as nondeadly force provides ample ground for a jury to
conclude that the police officer's use of excessive force
was pursuant to the Department's actual baton policy.
Second, the lack of training in non-deadly weapons,
including "live" training, proficiency certification, and
regular in-service training, could well result in a jury
finding that Baltimore City inadequately trained its
officers for the type of split-second judgments that they
would face in determining the type offorce to use. The
policy behind instituting such training requirements in
the use offirearms is just as strong, ifnot stronger, in the
context of non-deadly weapons, and failing to provide
such training could be seen as deliberate indifference. 64

1. The Misclassification of KOGAs Baton Techniques Provides Grounds for Liability for Inadequate
Training
Police officers are generally instructed to use the
minimum amount of force necessary to subdue a suspect. 65 The proper amount of force is typically judged
on a "continuum of force," which instructs officers to
start with little or no force, i.e. verbal commands, and
if this is ineffective, then to use physical force, such as
wrist holds and other non-deadly force alternatives, and
only as a final option to use deadly force. 66 Police
officers rely on this continuum as guidance in determining the proper use of force in any given situation they
face. Nevertheless, the usefulness and "reasonableness" of the continuum depends on the police department's proper assessment of the nature of the force in
a given technique. Thus, by labeling a baton strike to the
chest as non-deadly when it is properly considered to be
deadly force, police officers who use this technique will,
by definition, use excessive force in those situations in
which the police officers have been instructed to use the
28 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2

baton.
The history of the use of chokeholds by police
officers provides an example of the devastating consequences of a police department's misclassification of a
deadly force technique as non-deadly force. 67 Borrowed from the martial art of judo, the chokehold
technique has been around for many years.68 The main
type of chokehold is the "carotid" hold. The carotid
hold is applied, with the officer behind the person, by
placing one of the officer's arms around the person's
neck and holding the wrist of that arm with his other
hand. Then, by using the muscles in his forearm, the
officer applies pressure against the carotid arteries on
the sides of the person's neck. The chokehold is
designed to stop the flow of blood to the brain by
applying pressure to the carotic artery, thereby rendering the person unconscious. 69
There are many reasons the chokehold poses such
a threat to victims. First, the technique, given the
amount offorce applied and the position ofthe arm, can
result in the officer, even by accident, crushing the
victim's larynx, trachea, or thyroid, thereby resulting in
the victim suffering a cardiac arrest or asphyxiation. 70
Medical experts recognize that even a temporary carotid hold can result in serious injury or death. 71 Second,
because of the violent and frightening nature of such a
hold, victims will often violently struggle to free themselves.72 Such a struggle only encourages the police
officer to tighten the hold, thereby increasing the risk of
harm to the person.
In 1975, the Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD") began using the chokehold as a non-deadly
technique even where the suspect posed no threat of
violence. 73 Despite the factthat the use ofthe chokehold
posed a very "high and unpredictable risk of serious
injury or death," the LAPD officers were never instructed that the chokehold could cause death. 74 As a
result, between 1975 and 1980, theLAPD officers used
the chokehold technique in approximately 975 altercations with suspects, or approximately 75% of officersuspect confrontations. 75 As a direct result of the
chokehold, at least sixteen people died before the
LAPD, in 1982, recognized the misclassification and
stopped the practice in situations that called for less than
deadly force. 76
The LAPD was not alone in incurring a great deal
of problems as a result of authorizing the use of
chokeholds in less-than-deadly force situations. 77 Lia-

bility considerations led the Washington, D.C. Police
Department and the N ew York City Police Department
to prohibit the use of chokeholds by police officers,
except in situations calling for deadly force. 78 Indeed,
juries have repeatedly found that police officers used
excessive force where the carotid hold has been applied
in less than deadly force situations, and that the police
department and municipality were "deliberately indifferent" in failing to properly train the police officers in
the nature of the force, and the proper method for
utilizing such a technique.
For example, in 1992, a forty-three year old homeless man was involved in a six-minute physical struggle
with three police officers until the carotid hold was
applied. The jury, in awarding the plaintiff's estate
$470,000, found that the officer applying the hold used
excessive force, and the Commissioner ofthe California
Highway Patrol was liable because of his chokehold
training policies. 79 Nevertheless, many citizens in other
jurisdictions continue to suffer the consequences of the
chokehold technique when used in non-deadly force
situations. 80
The liability risk resulting from inadequate training
faced by the Baltimore City Police Department is
strikingly similar to that ofpolice departments that have
implemented the non-deadly chokehold technique.
Striking a person in the chest with the butt-end of a
baton poses such a significant risk of causing death or
serious injury that a jury would be well supported in
finding the police department liable for classifying this
baton technique as non-deadly force.

2. The Lack of Regular Training and Certification
Procedures in Non-Deadly Weapons and Techniques
Provides an Additional Ground for Section 1983
Liability for Inadequate Training
Baltimore City runs the risk of facing inadequate
training claims separate and apart from the issue of
misclassification of deadly force as non-deadly force.
Baltimore City, like many other major jurisdictions, has
concentrated heavily on regulating, training, and certifying police officers on the use of firearms to the point
where claims against a municipality based on inadequate training in the use of firearms are extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to prevail upon. 8 ) In Maryland, minimum requirements for firearm certification
are set by the Maryland Police Training Commission. 82

In-service training in the use of firearms includes two
hours of instruction a year in servicing weapons and
legal aspects regarding use offirearms. 83 Police officers
must also pass a proficiency test in firing their service
weapon annually.84 Additionally, police officers are
required to have eighteen hours additional job related
courses, and what is taught during these hours is left to
the discretion of each individual police department. 85
Nevertheless, when it comes to policies regarding
non-deadly weapons, there are no similar in-service
training or proficiency examination requirements. 86
Baltimore City is not alone in this respect. Most police
departments have little or no formal guidelines for the
use of non-deadly force, nor do these departments
provide certification or periodic in-service training
requirements. 81 There are many reasons why the failure
to require more detailed training, including certification
and additional in-service requirements may justify the
imposition of excessive force liability on a municipality.88
First, police departments know that officers will be
called upon to use their weapons in apprehending
suspects. Police officers need guidance in determining
when and how it is constitutionally appropriate to use
the various non-deadly weapons. As the United States
Supreme Court recognized in the context of firearms
training:
[C]ity policy-makers know to a moral
certainty that their police officers will be
required to arrest fleeing felons. The
city has armed its officers with firearms,
in part to allow them to accomplish this
task. Thus, the need to train officers in
the constitutional limitations on the use
of deadly force ... can be said to be "so
obvious," that failure to do so could
properly be characterized as 'deliberate
indifference' to constitutional rights. 89
The need for police officers to stay within the constitutionally permissible limits when using non-deadly force
is no less important and no less obvious. Indeed, an
officer is much more likely to be required to use nondeadly force on a suspect than deadly force. 90 Second,
in order for officers to be properly trained in using a
technique within constitutional limitations, there must
be training that occurs under the stress of actual street
26.2/ U. Bait. L.F. - 29

situations, and not merely out of a textbook or from a
lecture. Although dealing with the training required in
the use of firearms, the recent case of Zuchel v. City of
Denver, 9I provides an excellent framework for analyzing this liability aspect.
In Zuchel, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's refusal to set aside a $330, 000 judgment against
Denver for inadequate training in the use of deadly
force. The court relied heavily on expert testimony
produced at trial which revealed that Denver's District
Attorney had suggested to the Chief of Police several
steps to improve the deadly force training of police
officers. 92 Evidence at trial demonstrated that the
District Attorney recommended that the police department institute "live" judgment training, such as a
"shoot-don't shoot" course, rather than rely on a film
lecture series on decisional shooting. 93 This type of
judgment training, according to expert testimony produced at trial, is important because there is no other way
to teach strategic judgment in the use of force except
through periodic "shoot-don't shoot" field exercises. 94
Furthermore, the expert stated that the failure of a large
police department to offer this kind ofjudgment training
reflects a deliberate indifference considering the predictability that officers would face situations where
such judgment would be called upon. 95 Thus, the expert
concluded, without periodic judgment training, mistakes in the use of force are going to be made. 96 In light
of this evidence, the Tenth Circuit had' no difficulty
concluding that the evidence was "clearly sufficient" to
find that the failure to implement periodic judgment
training "constituted deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Denver citizens. "97 Thus, while
Zuchel concerned the use offirearms, there is an equally
compelling argument in requiring "live" training in
non-deadly force weaponry. A police officer usually
has only a split-second to determine whether a particular suspect poses a threat, what degree of a threat, and
what force is proper in response. 98 This is why many
perceive in-service training on non-deadly weapons,
including "live" training, as critical in ensuring the
proper use of force by a police officer. 99 As testimony
in Zuchel supports, it is predictable that police officers
who are given non-deadly force weapons will make
decisions under pressure regarding their use, and not
training police officers to make judgment calls under
such stress conditions reflects a deliberate indifference.
Similarly, although not finding liability for failing to
30 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2

require in-service training, the court in McQurter v.
City of Atlanta, 100 stressed the essential nature of inservice training on techniques and weapons. McQurter
involved the allegation that a police department failed to
provide in-service training in the use of the chokehold.
The court, which decided this case several years before
the United States Supreme Court decided Tennessee v.
Garner, took great pains to note that no in-service
training was being provided in a deadly force technique
such as chokeholds, although such training was being
provided in firearms. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the failure to provide in-service training in the
chokehold did not rise to the level of recklessness or
gross negligence required for the imposition ofliability.
The court, however, did hold that the failure to train
supervisors to deal with such life threatening conduct
constituted deliberate indifference. The police department had promoted supervisors without training them
on the use of the chokehold, the regulations governing
its use, or the risks a person may face when subject to
the chokehold.101
The requirements of "live" training, annual proficiency certifications, and in-service training should be
as formal and detailed as required for the use offirearms.
Superficial requirements would not be sufficient to
avoid inadequate training liability under section 1983,
as noted inMcKenzie v. CityofMi/pitas. 102 InMcKenzie,
the court denied the city's motion for summary judgment on the claim of inadequate training regarding the
use oftasers.l03 The taser training consisted of giving
police officers a copy of the city's policy on taser use,
discussing the policy with the officers, and teaching
officers to take subjects that have been tasered to the
emergency room. Moreover, the city not only required
that officers were not to use tasers without taking a
training course and passing a written test, but also
required a mandatory refresher course every year. 104
Even though these requirements surpass what most
police departments require today, the court found that
the city could be held liable for the inadequate training
of its police officers. Indeed, the plaintiff's allegation
that the requirements were simply superficial was supported by evidence that police officers were not told of
the "constitutional, moral, legal and ethical standards"
associated with using the taser. 105 Additionally, the
police officers were never instructed on the dangers of
prolonged continuation of electrical charges, thereby
encouraging officers to use the taser continually until

the suspect complies. Finally, it was alleged that the
written test on proper taser use was designed to be
passed, as demonstrated by the fact that no officer had
ever failed the test. 106 After the District Court denied the
city's motion for summary judgment, the jury found that
the City had inadequately trained its police officers in
the use ofthe taser and awarded the victim $200,000. 107
The inadequacy of superficial training requirements
was further stressed in Russo v. City oj Cincinnati, 108
where the Sixth Circuit addressed a claim that the city
had failed to adequately train its officers to deal with
mentally ill individuals, and this failure proximately
caused the shooting death of a paranoid schizophrenic.
In reversing the trial court's grant ofsummary judgment
for the city, the Sixth Circuit explained that sufficient
evidence was produced to generate a material dispute as
to whether the city's training in deadly force amounted
to deliberate indifference, and therefore, a failure to
adequately train. The court noted that testimony showed
that while there was some initial training on handling
mentally ill individuals, in-service training for dealing
with the mentally ill was non-existent. 109 Expert testimony revealed that "none of the involved police personnel understood the appropriate procedure for reacting to mentally ill individuals."I1° The court found that
offering a seven-hour course on "Disturbed-Distress
Persons" was insufficient in and of itself to shield the
city from liability. 111
Inadequate training liability, therefore, could be
imposed based on the Baltimore City Police Department's failure to provide more sophisticated training in
non-deadly weapons. Such a lack of training is known
to cause a substantial risk of constitutional violations
because police officers will be less capable of properly
and safely utilizing the weapon. The most innocuous
devices can become problematic when a municipality
fails to offer the annual certification and in-service
training for such weapons. Moreover, police officers
without such training tend to become much more
indiscriminate in the use ofnon-deadly weapons, which
often leads to the over use of the weapon. 112 This lack
oftraining can even tum otherwise non-deadly weapons
into deadly ones. 113
A prime example ofthe problems associated with a
lack of training is reflected in the use of pepper spray.
Pepper spray is an oily plant resin that is derived from
dried spices such as chili. 114 Pepper spray is considered
by law enforcement agencies to be a proper force after

the police officer's verbal commands fail to control the
suspect, but before hands-on type contact such as a
baton is utilized. liS When pepper spray is used on a
person, that person's airways tend to restrict, his eyelids
swell, and he feels a burning sensation on his skin and
membranes of the mouth and nose for approximately
twenty minutes. 116 The use ofthis spray, because of its
seemingly non-injurious nature, is widespread among
police departments, including Baltimore City's. 117
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") has
recently complained that police officers have become
"increasingly indiscriminate [about the use of pepper
spray] despite written expressions of' grave scientific
concern' by the Environmental Protection Agency regarding its safety."118 The sometimes free use of the
device can be problematic. 119 For example, in California, police officers used pepper spray 9,000 times over
the last year, at a rate oftwenty-four times a dayYo The
ACLU has recently petitioned the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission to regulate the use
of pepper spray by noting that twenty-seven criminal
suspects have died over the last two and one-half years
in California, and an estimated sixty-one people have
perished nationwide, after being subdued with pepper
spray by police officers. 121 Although the exact cause of
death ofthese victims was difficult to determine, a large
proportion ofthe victims had underlying heart or respiratory problems suggesting that the use of the spray
could have been a "serious complicating factor. "122
Assessing the harm caused by pepper spray is
complicated by the fact that law enforcement officials
will not evaluate their pepper spray training programs
unless definitive proof ofthe causal connection between
pepper spray and these deaths is produced. Law
enforcement agencies have been lulled into a false sense
ofsecurity by relying on studies that have shown that no
"long-term health risks" have been found as a result of
using the spray.123 Also, pepper spray manufacturers,
with a great deal at stake, contend that there is little or
no evidence that pepper spray caused any of the sixtyone deaths, pointing to the fact that medical examiners
only cited pepper spray as a factor in two of the
deaths. 124
The ACLU has argued that police departments
must begin to implement regulations and training programs to teach officers about the length oftime a person
can be sprayed, the danger that use of the spray can
cause to some individuals, especially high risk groups
26.2/ U. Bait. L.F. - 31

such as drug users and those with respiratory problems,
and the need for providing medical attention after
someone is sprayed. 125 Furthermore, instruction on the
effects ofcombining non-deadly force techniques should
be carefully analyzed, and appropriate policy formulated. Presently, this type of training is simply not taking
place in most police departments around the country.
The debate over the effects of pepper spray is
indicative of the problems associated with the use of
non-deadly force. Police departments have been very
reluctant to impose any restrictions or effective guidelines on the proper use of pepper spray by police
officers. While the causal connection between the use
of pepper spray and death has not been conclusively
proven, there is evidence that the effects ofpepper spray
tend to be aggravated by police officers' use of other
non-deadly techniques in conjunction with pepper spray,
such as stun guns, handcuffs, and manual holds. 126 This
is not to say that police officers should discontinue the
use ofpepper spray, but rather, they must recognize that
the use of all non-deadly weapons and techniques run
the risk of significant injury or death. Accordingly, civil
liability for inadequate training may result if police
departments fail to investigate the potential for harm in
the non-deadly weapons they use and refuse to increase
training through the use of "live" training, proficiency
certification, and in-service training in these weapons.
Additionally, the indiscriminate use of the non-deadly
weapons that accompany the lack of such training is a
cause of grave concern.

IV. CONCLUSION

pality involved.
Much ofthe liability concerns could be eliminated if
police departments, such as the Baltimore City Police
Department, imposed the same training requirements
for non-deadly weapons as these departments have
done with firearms. The policy justifications for mandating extensive proficiency and in-service training
requirements in regard to non-deadly weapons are just
as strong, ifnot more so, than in the context offirearms.
The use of "shoot-don't shoot" type training in nondeadly weapons would not only diminish the threat of
liability faced by police departments, but such training
would give police officers greater confidence and proficiency in using the weapons under stressful conditions. The need for such "live" training in the use of
non-deadly weapons is best supported by the fact that
most physical confrontations faced by police officers
will not call for deadly force, but rather, will require the
officers to make the difficult, split-second assessment of
what level of non-deadly force is appropriate. By
making the training in non-deadly weaponry more
extensive, and by carefully evaluating the level of force
a particular weapon or technique imposes, the police
departments will not only better protect its officers and
citizens from unnecessary physical injury, but protect
the municipality from unnecessary civil liability.
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